Too Late...

The evacuation of the Ambassador and remaining staff at the embassy was well underway despite the compressed timeline that came out of nowhere. Elements of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force were beginning to load up embassy staff and their belongings in up-armored vehicles for transportation to the Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ), which had been established by the Marines approximately 5 kilometers from the embassy. Sunrise was still a few hours away and the on-scene commander would use the cover of darkness to minimize the threat to his personnel, equipment and helos. A team of Marines would stay behind and turnout the lights before heading to the HLZ to catch the last helo out. Overwatch for any threats along the pre-planned, primary vehicle route was ongoing and had been for the last 72 hours. The Marines who secured/prepared the HLZ had radio'd in that the zones were secure and helos were inbound. Everything seemed on track for an uneventful evacuation.

In the 24x7 command center, the flow of information remained elevated and for many they were challenged to absorb it all, let alone make sense of it. Resources were stretched thin but they were doing the best they could to keep up. Additionally, the supporting organizations physically situated in the center, along with those connected at times via email and/or phone, were struggling to maintain a clear, unified situational awareness (SA) picture using their digital displays. Bogus icons and tracks with inaccurate metadata complicated the picture. In fact, what came out in the after action review (AAR) clearly showed that very few (if any) had a complete mental SA model, nor an ability to think through and discuss with the entire team what had changed, what could happen next and are we still prepared? Further adding to the fog, key support units had experienced power outages and their updates were becoming stale by the minute. One additional ankle biter for the commander and her leadership team were the intermittent and garbled comms with the Marines on the ground at the embassy. Was Murphy's Law in play? Did they see any of this coming? What challenges did the exercise scenario include? Another AAR item of note called out the tightly scripted, unimaginative evacuation exercise that didn't include any of the curve balls being thrown at this team. #trainlikeyoufight

Little did the commander know that her SA from the command center was also somewhat broken and garbled. 

Thirty minutes prior to the execute command being given, sketchy, unconfirmed information had been pushed out using numerous email aliases or called in to positions on the command center floor. This information, which originated from a variety of respected organizations, was fragmented at best and incomplete in every email chain sent and phone call placed. However, the information contained a reference to a possible threat in vicinity of the primary HLZ. These fragmented pieces of information were noticed by a few representatives in the command center but given they were unconfirmed, of unknown credibility and appeared disconnected from the digital SA picture on the knowledge wall - the information was initially ignored. One team lead told his analyst to wait until a credible, vetted, polished update was sent before sharing as he didn't want to get everyone on the floor all spun up. A second lead who put eyes on the information, did not feel comfortable sharing unconfirmed, though possibly highly-valued information with the commander and Marines at the embassy. His training had always emphasized the view that you share the right information, to the right customer, at the right time so they can make the right decision. This fleeting opportunity would soon be gone, washed away by the chop chop sound of the blades from the inbound helicopters.

To be continued...

Take a moment and review the storyline above. In your view, what were the critical decisions and behaviors that unfolded in this scenario that would enable the "too late" model to play out? I wonder - are there challenges like these during a major, complex wildfire or weather-related incident? Share your thoughts in a comment - I would love to see them.

Too late. For those who have worked in a command post or operations center (or similar venues in emergency management), I think you would agree that those two words cut like a knife. Especially when spoken by a commander during an AAR. Yes, that key piece of information that was noticed but shared too late or not shared at all. #ouch

Consider the graphic below, built by Jolt a number of years ago to highlight one of the challenges of sharing information. The y-axis represents the value/quality while the x-axis represents time. That critical, yet uncomfortable information action zone (for many) is highlighted in yellow - where information is of low quality but could have high value to commanders and down-range units. What if this unconfirmed information had been identified with the appropriate caveats, sourced, put in context of where/when and shared for discussion? What if?

Of course in a perfect world we would all love to wait for information to be polished and in the 95+% confidence arena before sharing - what we would call the information comfort zone. That's where our traditional priorities push us. Granted, to some there is great value in that information, but for others like a commander is it simply too late?

Too Late Model - Jim H.

Preview of Coming Attractions: Single viewpoint situational awareness is necessary but insufficient in complex, adversarial contexts. The quiet, uneventful evacuation was about to get messy and the digital SA visuals on the knowledge wall were not going to be of much help.

Stay tuned...

Humbly,
Collabman